Managerial Entrenchment and Corporate Social Performance
用22国358家公司2002-2005年数据，检验管理层固守行为与社会绩效、财务绩效的关系，发现固守经理可能与利益相关者合谋，且固守与社会责任结合会损害财务绩效。
Abstract: We examine empirically the relationships amongst managerial entrenchment practices, social performance, and financial performance. We hypothesize that entrenched managers may collude with non‐shareholder stakeholders in order to reinforce their entrenchment strategy; this is particularly so in firms that have efficient internal control mechanisms. Moreover, we prove that the combination of entrenchment strategies and the implementation of socially responsible actions have particularly negative effects on financial performance. We test these contentions with a sample of 358 companies, from 22 different countries, for the period 2002–2005.