Inequality and Conservation on the Local Commons: A Theoretical Exercise
通过一个两人非合作模型，分析资产不平等如何影响公共资源保护合作，发现不平等与保护效率呈U型关系，为资源管理政策提供理论参考。
Abstract. To analyze the eect of asset inequality on cooperation within a group, we consider a two-player noncooperative model of conservation of a common-pool resource. Overexploitation by one user aects another's payo by reducing the next-period catch. We give necessary and sucient conditions such that conservation is a Nash equilibrium, and show that increasing inequality does not, in general, favor full conservation. However, once inequality is suciently great, further inequality can raise eciency. Thus the relationship between inequality and economic eciency is U-shaped. Finally, we analyze the implications for conservation if players have earning opportunities outside the commons.