Communication and influence
研究一组具有局部知识和定向收益互动的代理人之间的信息流，刻画了沟通与影响力的均衡特征，发现协调动机主导时，代理人的影响力近似与其特征向量中心性成正比，并解释了组织中的小团体、人力资源实践和正式层级与实际影响力的差异。
We study the information flows that arise among a set of agents with local knowledge and directed payoff interactions, which differ among pairs of agents. First, we study the equilibrium of a game where, before making decisions, agents can invest in pairwise active communication (speaking) and pairwise passive communication (listening). This leads to a full characterization of information and influence flows. Second, we show that, when the coordination motive dominates the adaptation motive, the influence of an agent on all his peers is approximately proportional to his eigenvector centrality. Third, we use our results to explain organizational phenomena such as: the emergence of work cliques; the adoption of human resources practices that foster communication (especially active communication); and the discrepancy between formal hierarchy and actual influence.