Institutional Solutions to the Asymmetric Information Problem in Health and Development Services for the Poor
系统综述了在政府监管薄弱的国家，贫困人口购买专业服务时面临的信息不对称问题，发现通过本地管理组织支付比直接支付给个人更能提升服务质量，尤其当组织具有利他传统并吸纳客户参与时。
The world’s poorest pay for professional services and thus are in a “market,” whether the services are provided in the public or private sectors. The associated problems of unequal information are particularly acute in undergoverned countries, where state regulation is weak. We systematically review the evidence on solutions to these problems in a variety of professions. Payments by clients are more likely to have a positive effect on quality if they are made through locally-managed organizations rather than directly to individual practitioners, particularly if those organizations have an institutionalized history of other—regarding values and incorporate client participation.