The Hidden Advantage of Delegation: Pareto Improvements in a Gift Exchange Game
研究将工资决策权委托给员工对绩效和收入的影响，发现委托显著提高努力水平，并实现雇主和员工收入的帕累托改进，即使工资相似时委托也带来更高绩效。
This paper analyzes the effect on performance and earnings of delegating the wage choice to employees. Our results show that such delegation significantly increases effort levels. Moreover, we observe a Pareto improvement, as the earnings of both employers and employees increase when employers delegate than when they do not. Interestingly, we also find that the employees' performance under delegation is higher than under nondelegation, even for similar wages. While there is strong evidence that behavior reflects strategic considerations, this result also holds for one-shot interactions. A possible nonstrategic motivation explaining the positive reaction to delegation is a sense of enhanced responsibility.