Strategic Transparency and Informed Trading: Will Capital Market Integration Force Convergence of Corporate Governance?
研究主导投资者如何通过影响信息收集成本来操控公司透明度，发现贷款方偏好低透明度以保护弱势企业，而股东偏好高透明度；市场互动和全球交易会削弱银行控制，迫使公司治理趋同。
Dominant investors can influence the publicly available information about firms by affecting the cost of information collection. Under strategic competition, transparency results in higher variability of profits and output. Thus, lenders prefer less transparency, since this protects firms when in a weak competitive position, while equity holders prefer more. Market interaction creates strategic complementarity in gathering information on competing firms, thus entry by transparent competitors will improve price informativeness. Moreover, as the return to information gathering increases with liquidity, increasing global trading may undermine the ability of bank control to keep firms opaque.