Does ABC Information Exacerbate Hold-Up Problems in Buyer-Supplier Negotiations?
研究发现，在买卖双方谈判中，共享精细成本信息虽能提高效率，但因担心不公平结果，谈判者更不愿共享精细信息，反而可能加剧敲竹杠问题。
Negotiations between buyers and suppliers that require sharing cost details to identify profitable relationship specific investments often fail and result in hold-ups. Based on inequity aversion, strategic uncertainty, and risk dominance criteria, we expect negotiators to be more reluctant to share fine information than coarse, less detailed information, which suggests that fine information systems can exacerbate hold-ups. When negotiators share fine information they achieve more efficient bargaining agreements. However, we find that strategic concerns about inequitable outcomes (fear of opportunistic behavior) lead fewer negotiating pairs to share fine information (where inequitable outcomes can be larger) than coarse information (where inequitable outcomes are smaller). Our results demonstrate that information fineness leads negotiators to trade-off potential utility losses due to fairness considerations and potential monetary gains. Fewer (more) negotiators chose to share fine (coarse) information and thus minimize fairness based utility losses (maximize monetary gains).