Strategic Disclosure of Research Results: The Cost of Proving Your Honesty
研究有偏见的发送者向接收者提供可验证信息时，策略性报告如何影响信息搜寻激励，发现发送者未观察到的研究努力会迫使其进行更多研究并披露全部信息，但额外研究可能有益社会，强制披露反而可能降低福利。
In situations where a biased sender provides verifiable information to a receiver, I study how strategic reporting affects the incentives to search for information. Research provides series of signals that can be used selectively in reporting. I show that the sender is strictly worse off when his research effort is not observed by the receiver: he has to conduct more research than in the observable case and in equilibrium, discloses all the information he obtained. However this extra research can be socially beneficial and mandatory disclosure of results can thus be welfare reducing. Finally I identify cases where the sender withholds evidence and for which mandatory disclosure rules become more attractive. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009.