Preventing Crime Waves
研究了执法资源事前确定且事后缺乏弹性时的执法机制设计，发现多重均衡自然出现，并解释了为何对中等行为使用非最大惩罚：在帕累托较差的犯罪浪潮均衡中，边际惩罚的净收益为正，而在非犯罪浪潮均衡中则常为负。
We study the design of enforcement mechanisms when enforcement resources are chosen ex ante and are inelastic ex post. Multiple equilibria arise naturally. We identify a new answer to the old question of why non-maximal penalties are used to punish moderate actions: “marginal” penalties are much more attractive in the Pareto inferior crime wave equilibrium. Specifically, although marginal penalties have both costs and benefits, the net benefit is strictly positive in the crime wave equilibrium. In contrast, marginal penalties frequently have a net cost in the noncrime wave equilibrium. We also show that increasing enforcement resources may worsen crime.