Efficiency and Distribution in Greenhouse Negotiations
分析了温室气体问题的国际层面，通过限制国家间减排任务分配且不允许补偿支付，考察了公平与效率的权衡，并利用全球十二区域的两期模型进行了实证说明。
The authors analyze the international aspects of the greenhouse problem. The equity versus efficiency trade-off is examined by reducing the set of instruments to the allocation of abatement efforts over countries without the possibility of side payments. The traditional cost-effective allocation of abatement efforts is no longer necessarily optimal. The trade-off is illustrated empirically by combining the available cost and benefit estimates in a simplified two-period model with twelve regions in the world. In a second application, the authors follow an inverse optimum approach and compute the power weights implicit in actual agreements. Copyright 1993 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG