Education, Matching, and the Allocative Value of Romance
研究婚姻匹配习俗如何影响年轻人的教育投资和夫妻的联合劳动供给，发现为钱结婚提升投资效率，而为爱结婚则通过增加高学历女性劳动参与提高总产出。
Societies are characterized by customs governing the allocation of non-market goods such as marital partnerships. We explore how such customs affect the educational investment decisions of young singles and the subsequent joint labor supply decisions of partnered couples. We consider two separate matching paradigms-one where partners marry for money and the other where partners marry for romantic reasons orthogonal to productivity or debt. Whereas marrying for money generates greater investment efficiency, romantic matching, by increasing the number of educated and talented women who participate in the labour market, increases aggregate productivity..