Labor Contracting and a Theory of Contract Choice in California Agriculture
构建了一个劳动合同模型，分析季节性、劳动质量与工作强度对合同选择的影响，并利用加州农场工人与雇主数据估计承包概率与工资，发现工会化或减少非法移民会降低承包并提高工资。
Abstract We present a model of labor contracts, where seasonality, the sensitivity of output to labor quality and work intensity, and the relative advantages of labor contractors in recruitment and growers in supervision of seasonal farm workers determine the choice of employment contract. Differences in the optimal means of extracting work result in lower wages paid under labor contracting than direct hiring. We derive and estimate the probability of labor contracting and wages as functions of worker and job characteristics using data on California farm workers and employers. From estimated expected wages, our results indicate that successful unionization or reducing the flow of undocumented workers into California agriculture both would reduce contracting and increase wages.