Farmer Behavior under Risk of Failure
分析农场失败风险如何影响农民的投入决策，发现需要现金支出的投入品实际成本更高，最优边际产出高于无风险时的价格水平，并以伊利诺伊州玉米生产数据验证，表明大农场更接近利润最大化。
Abstract We analyze input decisions under risk of farm failure. Inputs with immediate cash outlays have greater effective than observed prices because their cost increases the probability of failure, and their optimal marginal products are higher than observed prices would warrant under strict profit maximizing without failure risk. An algebraic example illustrates the market equilibrium effects of failure risk. We apply the model to an analysis of Illinois corn production (1971–79). Results indicate that larger farms deviate less than smaller farms from strict profit maximization. Over the period studied, farmers moved further from setting marginal products equal to observed prices.