The Durable Experiment: State Insurance of Workers' Compensation Risk in the Early Twentieth Century
研究了20世纪初美国各州在工人赔偿风险承保上选择公立还是私立保险的原因，通过定量和案例分析方法，发现强大工会与弱势保险和农业利益的结合导致一些州采用垄断州基金，而进步政治联盟在其他州起决定性作用。
In the early 1910s state governments debated the private versus public underwriting of workers' compensation risk. The choices they made established the existing system today and set the stage for later debates over the government's underwriting of unemployment, health, and disability risks. This article offers both quantitative and case-study analyses of states' original choices between public and private insurance. Monopoly state funds were adopted in some states because of an unusual combination of strong unions and weak insurance and agricultural interests. In other states, the emergence of progressive political coalitions played the decisive role.