动态选择实验中的随机激励系统

Random incentive systems in a dynamic choice experiment

Experimental Economics · 2011
被引 97
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

研究了随机激励系统在复杂动态选择实验中的表现,发现被试间随机化降低风险厌恶,被试内随机化虽无偏但存在任务间传递效应,两者均增加错误率,提醒在动态任务中谨慎使用。

Abstract

Abstract Experiments frequently use a random incentive system (RIS), where only tasks that are randomly selected at the end of the experiment are for real. The most common type pays every subject one out of her multiple tasks (within-subjects randomization). Recently, another type has become popular, where a subset of subjects is randomly selected, and only these subjects receive one real payment (between-subjects randomization). In earlier tests with simple, static tasks, RISs performed well. The present study investigates RISs in a more complex, dynamic choice experiment. We find that between-subjects randomization reduces risk aversion. While within-subjects randomization delivers unbiased measurements of risk aversion, it does not eliminate carry-over effects from previous tasks. Both types generate an increase in subjects’ error rates. These results suggest that caution is warranted when applying RISs to more complex and dynamic tasks.

随机激励系统动态选择实验风险厌恶误差率