Friend or Foe? The Role of State and Mutual Fund Ownership in the Split Share Structure Reform in China
研究中国股权分置改革中，国有股东与共同基金持股对补偿方案的影响，发现国有持股提高补偿比例，共同基金持股降低补偿比例，尤其在国有企业中更明显。
Abstract The recent split share structure reform in China involves the nontradable shareholders proposing a compensation package to the tradable shareholders in exchange for the listing rights of their shares. We find that state ownership (the major owners of nontradable shares) has a positive effect on the final compensation ratio. In contrast, mutual fund ownership (the major institutional owner of tradable shares) has a negative effect on the compensation ratio and especially in state-owned firms. The evidence is consistent with our predictions that state shareholders have incentives to complete the reform quickly and exert political pressure on mutual funds to accept the terms without a fight.