New, Like New, or Very Good? Reputation and Credibility
研究了卖家通过诚实公布商品质量来建立声誉的机制，高能力卖家保持诚实，低能力卖家可能说谎，廉价交谈促进了市场对卖家能力的了解并增强了声誉效应。
We show that sellers may earn a reputation for their “ability” to deliver high-quality goods on average by honestly announcing the realized quality of items for sale every period. As the expected revenue stream from continuing with honest communication increases with their ability, high-ability sellers remain honest while low-ability sellers find it too costly and sometimes lie about quality for short-term gain. Thus, cheap-talk communication facilitates the market's learning of a seller's ability and strengthens reputation effects. We study this new reputation mechanism and the induced market dynamics, first when sellers cannot restart with a new identity and second when they can. We extend the analysis to various other situations such as voluntary refund and moral hazard.