Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare
通过信号博弈模型研究竞选广告的作用及法律限制的可能性，发现完全理性的选民可能因广告禁令而福利改善，且利益集团的分裂性捐款可能损害选民利益。
This paper investigates the role of campaign advertising and the opportunity of legal restrictions on it. An electoral race is modeled as a signalling game with three classes of players: many voters, two candidates, and one interest group. The group has non-verifiable insider information on the candidates ’ quality and, on the basis of this information, offers a contribution to each candidate in exchange for a favorable policy position. Candidates spend the contributions they receive on non-directly informative advertising. This paper shows that: (1) A separating equilibrium exists in which the group contributes to a candidate only if the insider information about that candidate is positive; (2) Although voters are fully rational, a ban on campaign advertising can be welfare-improving; and (3) Split contributions may arise in equilibrium (and, if they arise too often, they are detrimental to voters).