Effects of Concentrated Ownership and Owner Management on Small Business Debt Financing
利用独特数据和蒙特卡洛统计工具，研究了集中所有权与所有者管理对小型企业债权人与股东代理冲突的影响，发现从企业主角度看影响显著，但从商业贷款人角度不显著。
Using unique data and a new powerful Monte Carlo-based statistical tool, we examine the effects of concentrated ownership and owner–management (CO-OM) on the creditor–shareholder agency conflicts in small firms. A significant CO-OM effect from the small business owner's view, but insignificant from the commercial lenders' perspective, is found. Special features of informational asymmetry problems in small firms with CO-OM are also highlighted. Theoretical and empirical contributions are made to the small business management and corporate governance literature. Findings obtained from this research have important implications for small business practitioners as well as researchers, and this study can serve as a reference for policymakers and institutional lenders to assist small firms in successfully raising money through debt financing. In addition, a new powerful methodology is introduced to deal with various potential statistical biases and can be further applied to this line of research.