Adoption of Interrelated Agricultural Innovations: Complementarity and the Impacts of Risk, Scale, and Credit
构建了一个农场面对两项相互关联创新时的决策模型，区分了创新的规模报酬特征，并指出在不确定性或信贷约束下，直观的互补性概念可能误导，需重新定义互补性以解释为何促进一项创新的政策可能抑制另一项。
Abstract The paper presents a model of farm decisions which arise when a farm is faced with two interrelated innovations. The innovations are distinguished by their returns to scale, and may be adopted individually. It is shown that under conditions of uncertainty or a binding credit constraint, the intuitive concept of innovations' complementarity may be misleading, and a more relevant definition of complementarity is derived. The latter helps to explain why policies which enhance adoption of one innovation may discourage adoption of the other, even when the two innovations seem to complement each other.