DISCRIMINATION AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION
研究了一个包含解雇成本的搜索模型，发现企业可能基于可观察特征（如群体归属）实施歧视性招聘标准，导致受歧视群体失业率更高、招聘标准更严、任期更长，且就业保护会加剧其相对失业率。
We study a search model with firing cost. We show that there exists an equilibrium with discriminatory hiring standards of worker only differing in an observable characteristic determining their type. Even though the firm can observe the workers' expected productivity at the hiring stage, it still may condition its hiring standard on group belonging, due to feedback effects of other firm' hiring standards. The model predicts higher unemployment rates, stricter hiring standards, longer tenure for discriminated workers and a positive relation between employment protection and relative unemployment rates for discriminated workers.