Time Inconsistency and Free‐Riding in a Monetary Union
揭示货币联盟中货币政策的时间不一致会导致非货币政策领域出现新型搭便车问题，促使成员国采取宽松政策推高通胀，并探讨通过约束非货币政策来缓解该问题。
In monetary unions, a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy leads to a novel type of free‐rider problem in the setting of non‐monetary policies. The free‐rider problem leads union members to pursue lax non‐monetary policies that induce the monetary authority to generate high inflation. Free‐riding can be mitigated by imposing constraints on non‐monetary policies. Without a time inconsistency problem, the union has no free‐rider problem; then constraints on non‐monetary policies are unnecessary and possibly harmful. This theory is here detailed and applied to several non‐monetary policies: labor market policy, fiscal policy, and bank regulation.