Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
扩展了Maskin关于纳什实施的结果，给出了三个及以上代理人情形下纳什可实施的充要条件，并首次为两个代理人情形（契约与讨价还价应用中的关键情形）建立了充要条件，进而推导出适用于多种经济环境的更简单的充分条件。
The authors extend E. Maskin's results on Nash implementation. First, they establish a condition that is both necessary and sufficient for Nash implementability if there are three or more agents (the case covered by Maskin's sufficiency result). Second--and more important--they examine the two-agent case (for which there existed no general sufficiency results). The two-agent model is the leading case for applications to contracting and bargaining. For this case, too, they establish a condition that is both necessary and sufficient. The authors use their theorems to derive simpler sufficiency conditions that are applicable in a wide variety of economic environments. Copyright 1990 by The Econometric Society.