The Formation of Cooperatives: A Game‐Theoretic Approach with Implications for Cooperative Finance, Decision Making, and Stability
用博弈论模型分析个人为何组建合作社，研究单一和多个合作社的稳定性、融资规则和成员政策，对合作社管理者及研究合作社经济学的学者有参考价值。
Abstract This paper departs from the traditional organization‐oriented approach to cooperative analysis. It exploits cooperation's functional similarity to vertical integration to examine individuals' incentives to form cooperatives. A model of formation of a purchasing cooperative is presented and developed as an n ‐person game with the core as a solution concept. Core existence is examined for both single‐ and multiple‐cooperative configurations, and cooperative finance methods are examined relative to finding core‐compatible allocation rules. The results provide insight into a cooperative's equilibrium output, stability, decision making, financing methods, and choice of open or restricted membership.