An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
在有限两人博弈中加入一轮预博弈沟通（廉价谈话），刻画了在随机动态适应过程中稳定的策略集，发现无利益冲突时仅有效结果稳定，一般博弈中稳定收益集通常很大且每个有效收益无限次重现。
We add a round of pre-play communication to a finite two-player game played by a population of players.Pre-play communication is cheap talk in the sense that it does not directly enter the payoffs.The paper characterizes the set of strategies that are stable with respect to a stochastic dynamic adaptive process.Periodically players have an opportunity to change their strategy with a strategy that is more successful against the current population.Any strategy that weakly improves upon the current poorest performer in the population enters with positive probability.When there is no conflict of interest between the players, only the efficient outcome is stable with respect to these dynamics.For general games the set of stable payoffs is typically large.Every efficient payoff recurs infinitely often.