Contracting in the wine supply chain with bilateral moral hazard, residual claimancy and multi-tasking
通过准案例方法，基于剩余索取权的委托代理模型，分析了葡萄种植者与酒庄之间的最优分成合同，考虑了种植者在不同可测度活动间的努力分配及双边道德风险，预测与澳大利亚、加州、新西兰和法国的实际合同相符。
This paper takes a quasi-case-study approach to stylised wine industry facts to assess predictions about the optimal sharing rule from a principal–agent model with residual claimancy. An optimal sharing contract is developed between a grape grower and a winery, when a risk-averse grower allocates efforts among multiple activities that differ in measurability, while double-sided moral hazard is assumed to be present. Several comparative static results regarding the Pareto optimal share are in line with certain production practices and properties of observed contracts that are found in markets where residual claimancy is used, namely in Australia, California, New Zealand and France. , Oxford University Press.