Asset Write‐Offs in the Absence of Agency Problems
利用大量小型私营公司样本，发现在无代理问题且税法与会计高度一致的背景下，经济激励（如避税和政治成本）显著影响资产注销决策，而非会计准则的规定。
Abstract: Using a large sample of small private companies, we show incremental influence of economic incentives over prescriptions from accounting standards by financial statement preparers in a code‐law setting with high alignment between financial and tax reporting and no agency problems. Contrary to predictions from standards, more profitable companies are more likely to write‐off and the write‐off magnitude is greater, reflecting tax minimisation. Larger companies are more likely to write‐off, but the magnitude decreases with size, reflecting increasing political costs due to greater visibility to tax authorities. Previous write‐off patterns and magnitudes are persistent, reflecting institutional learning linked to regulatory changes.