Compensation Vega, Deregulation, and Risk‐Taking: Lessons from the US Banking Industry
研究了美国银行CEO薪酬对风险的敏感度（vega）与工业企业的差异、其决定因素以及对银行风险承担的影响，发现银行CEO的vega远低于工业企业，但更大、投资机会更好或处于放松管制环境的银行会提高vega，且vega越高银行风险越大。
Abstract: This study examines three issues related to the sensitivity of bank CEO compensation to risk, or vega: (1) its relevance compared with CEO compensation vega in industrial firms; (2) its determinants; and (3) its effect on bank risk‐taking. Using a sample of 156 US bank holding companies (BHCs) and a benchmark sample of 544 industrial firms over the period 1993–2006, we find that the vega of CEO compensation in banking is of a much smaller magnitude than the vega of CEO compensation in industrial firms, despite an effort by BHCs to increase it since the mid‐1990s. We also find that larger BHCs with better investment opportunities and those that operate in a deregulated environment reward their CEOs with a compensation that has a higher sensitivity to risk. Finally, our analyses show that BHCs in which CEOs receive a higher compensation vega assume a higher risk.