Audit Committees, Boards, and the Quality of Reported Earnings*
基于1994-2000年252家美国公司数据，研究审计委员会和董事会特征与财务报告质量的关系，发现其结构与盈余质量符合代理理论预测。
Abstract I use data on 252 U.S. firms between 1994 and 2000 to study the relationship between audit committees and boards of directors with financial reporting quality. I initially document several changes in committee and board profile during the sample period. Results from logistic regressions suggest that measures of audit committee and board structure are related to earnings quality in a manner that is generally consistent with the predictions of agency theory. This study contributes to extant knowledge by employing different earnings quality measures from prior studies, and by expanding the range of audit committee attributes deemed important in determining audit committee performance.