The Old‐Boy Network and the Young‐Gun Effect
研究一个由私人交往决定成员资格的排外群体（老男孩网络）如何通过只与已证明的非成员交易来保护自己，但这损害了未入网但有能力的个体，且因招募新成员产生公共品，均衡中招募不足。
A model of an exclusive group or class whose membership is governed by personal contact and interaction is studied. Members of this old‐boy network attempt to shield themselves from transacting with opportunistic or incompetent individuals by dealing only infrequently with unproven nonmembers. This injures the unproven but qualified agents not in the network. Moreover, because recruitment of a new member creates a public good for network members, too little recruiting is performed in equilibrium.