Testing Agency Theory with Entrepreneur Effort and Wealth
构建了一个创业环境下的委托代理模型，利用私营企业数据检验发现：企业家持股比例随外部财富增加而上升、随企业风险增加而下降；努力随持股增加而增加，并提升企业绩效。代理成本有助于解释企业家为何将大量财富集中于企业股权。
ABSTRACT We develop a principal‐agent model in an entrepreneurial setting and test the model's predictions using unique data on entrepreneurial effort and wealth in privately held firms. Accounting for unobserved firm heterogeneity using instrumental‐variables techniques, we find that entrepreneurial ownership shares increase with outside wealth and decrease with firm risk; effort increases with ownership; and effort increases firm performance. The magnitude of the effects in the cross‐section of firms suggests that agency costs may help explain why entrepreneurs concentrate large fractions of their wealth in firm equity.