Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers
提出一个模型，说明政策制定者在经济好时维持固定汇率、失业率高时贬值，并发现如果失业率有持续性，执行强硬政策反而会降低未来不贬值承诺的可信度，并用欧洲货币体系利率数据验证了这一假说。
Standard models of policy credibility, defined as the expectation that an announced policy will be carried out, emphasize the preferences of the policymaker and the role of tough policies in signaling toughness and raising credibility. Whether a policy is carried out, however, will also reflect the state of the economy. We present a model in which a policymaker maintains a fixed parity in good times, but devalues if the unemplo3nnent rate gets too high. Our main conclusion is that if there is persistence in unemplo3n3ient, observing a tough policy in a given period may lower rather than raise the credibility of a no-devaluation pledge in subsequent periods. We test this implication on EMS interest rates and find support for our hypothesis.