The deterrent to dubious corporate behavior: Profitability, probability and safety recalls
研究了股票市场对缺陷汽车生产等可疑企业行为的威慑效果，质疑市场作为社会控制工具的有效性，对政策制定者和投资者有参考价值。
Abstract In response to findings of abnormal stock market reactions following such dubious corporate behaviors as bribery, fraud, and the production of hazardous products, some researchers have argued that the stock market reaction is a sufficient deterrent to these behaviors so that additional regulation is not necessary. In this paper we examine stock market returns as a deterrent to dubious behavior in the production of defective automobiles. Relying on a broader range of assumptions about managerial behavior than are used in previous studies, we question the efficacy of the market as an instrument of social control.