Temptation and Self-Control
构建一个两期模型，研究决策者在第二期可能被前期较差的选项诱惑的情况。通过公理推导出承诺排序、诱惑排序和自我控制成本的表示，并比较不同个体的承诺偏好和自我控制程度。
We study a two-period model where ex ante inferior choice may tempt the decision-maker in the second period. Individuals have preferences over sets of alternatives that represent second period choices. Our axioms yield a representation that identifies the individual's commitment ranking, temptation ranking, and cost of self-control. An agent has a preference for commitment if she strictly prefers a subset of alternatives to the set itself. An agent has self-control if she resists temptation and chooses an option with higher ex ante utility. We introduce comparative measures of preference for commitment and self-control and relate them to our representations.