The Dynamic (In)Efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee
构建了一个模型，由异质性委员会通过动态投票博弈选择货币政策工具值。成员权力和偏好差异导致决策动态低效且惯性围绕先前值，内生产生政策变量的自相关性，有助于解释实际利率变化分布中零值众数的经验现象。
This paper develops a model where the value of the monetary policy instrument is selected by a heterogenous committee engaged in a dynamic voting game. Committee members differ in their institutional power, and in certain states of nature, they also differ in their preferred instrument value. Preference heterogeneity and concern for the future interact to generate decisions that are dynamically inefficient and inertial around the previously agreed instrument value. This model endogenously generates autocorrelation in the policy variable and helps explain the empirical observation that the distribution of actual interest rate changes has a mode of zero.