Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs
研究了动态集体决策中当前决策如何影响未来政治权力分配，刻画了动态稳定状态的条件，并分析了效率改进可能因引发后续变化而受阻的现象。
In dynamic collective decision making, current decisions determine the future distribution of political power and influence future decisions. We develop a general framework to study this class of problems. Under acyclicity, we characterize dynamically stable states as functions of the initial state and obtain two general insights. First, a social arrangement is made stable by the instability of alternative arrangements that are preferred by sufficiently powerful groups. Second, efficiency-enhancing changes may be resisted because of further changes they will engender. We use this framework to analyze dynamics of political rights in a society with different types of extremist views.