Explaining Sales Pay Strategy Using Agency, Transaction Cost and Resource Dependence Theories*
利用325家法裔加拿大组织的数据，检验代理、交易成本和资源依赖理论的关键构念对销售薪酬中固定工资比例的影响，发现绩效信息、不确定性和资源依赖有显著增量贡献，且多理论整合能更好解释薪酬政策。
ABSTRACT The purpose of this study is to investigate, using data gathered from 325 French‐Canadian organizations, the influence of key constructs related to agency, transaction cost and resource dependence theories on the proportion of salary in sales compensation. Usefulness analysis showed that performance information (9 per cent), uncertainty (8 per cent) and dependence resource (5 per cent) constructs have a significant incremental contribution to sales compensation. Regarding specific hypothesis tests, results of full model show that the capacity to observe behaviour, team sales and financial resources offered are associated with an increased use of salary pay. In contrast, adaptability of product/service‐related resources, salesforce experience and high marginal salesforce productivity are associated with decreased use of the salary component. However, the results of full model have failed to support the direction or influence of relationships between programmability, span of control, market and selling uncertainty, the predominance of salespeople and TCA measures on proportion of salary. The results support the argument that integration of multiple theoretical perspectives better explains pay policy.