Competition in Price and Availability When Availability is Unobservable
建立了一个价格与可得性竞争的战略模型，需求不确定，消费者根据可观察的价格和对不可观察库存的预期选择商店。模型显示企业用高价“信号”高可得性，从而为均衡价格和行业利润设定了下限，无论企业数量多少。对理解视频租赁行业的价格与可得性关系有用。
I present a strategic model of competition in price and availability in which demand is uncertain and consumers choose where to shop given firms ’ observable prices and their expectations of firms ’ unobservable inventories. In both a single period Cournot model (inventories are chosen first) and a single period Bertrand model (prices are chosen first) I show that firms use higher prices to “signal ” higher availability. This creates a floor on equilibrium prices and industry profits regardless of the number of firms. The model is useful in understanding the relationship between price and availability in the video rental industry.