MULTIPLE‐PRIZE CONTESTS – THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF PRIZES
综述了多奖项竞赛中奖项分配对参与者努力投入的激励效应，指出一等奖总是正向激励，而后续奖项效果不确定，最优分配取决于目标函数、个体特征和竞赛类型。
Abstract Multiple‐prize contests are important in various fields of economics ranging from rent seeking over labour economics, patent and R&D races to tendering for (governmental) projects. Hence it is crucial to understand the incentive effects of multiple prizes on effort investment. This survey attempts to outline, compare and evaluate the results from the literature. While a first prize always results in a positive incentive to invest effort, second and later prizes lead to ambiguous effects. Depending on the objective function, the characteristics of the individuals and the type of contest a different prize allocation is optimal.