Fairness, envy, guilt and greed: Building equity considerations into agency theory
研究了公平考量对高管决策的影响，修正了Fehr-Schmidt公平模型，挑战了代理理论和锦标赛理论的传统假设，强调公平因素在激励机制设计中的重要性。
In this article we examine the extent to which fairness considerations are salient to senior executives, and consider the implications for agency theory, tournament theory and the design of top-management incentives. We look for patterns in a unique data set of senior executive preferences and seek explanations for these patterns using a model of fairness first advanced by Fehr and Schmidt in 1999. We propose a number of amendments to Fehr and Schmidt’s model. We challenge some of the standard tenets of agency theory and tournament theory, demonstrating why equity considerations should be taken into account. We add to the growing literature on behavioural agency theory.