Bertrand-Edgeworth Equilibria When Firms Avoid Turning Customers Away
研究了在严格凸成本下伯特兰-埃奇沃思模型中纯策略均衡不存在的问题，通过引入拒客成本，证明在行业足够大时竞争价格成为均衡，且所有均衡接近竞争结果。
This paper provides a simple solution to the problem of nonexistence of pure-strategy equilibria in Bertrand-Edgeworth models with strictly convex costs. The voluntary-trading constraint in standard Bertrand-Edgeworth models is generalized to allow for there being costs incurred when customers are turned away. So long as the industry is sufficiently large, the presence of such costs ensures that the competitive price will be an equilibrium. There will be other single price equilibria, but if the offense costs are small, all equilibria will be close to the competitive outcome.