Local Common Property Exploitation with Rewards
研究了在牲畜私有、牧场公有的系统中，合作联盟的形成机制，发现成本优势可解释更高参与率，并实现比“公地悲剧”更温和的开发水平。
ABSTRACT. This paper analyzes coalition forma-tion in a livestock-pasture system where livestock are privately owned and the pasture is a common property. While standard models predict rather low prospects of cooperation, this paper introduces a cost advantage of cooperation based on Saami reindeer herding that may explain higher coalition participa-tion. In contrast to the existing fishery literature on coalition formation, all players are assumed ex ante homogenous but may differ ex post due to the cost advantage. A stable equilibrium with cooperation can be reached and a moderate exploitation level can be sustained compared to the ‘‘tragedy of the commons’ ’ outcome. I.