Income distributional effects of using market‐based instruments for managing common property resources
研究了在异质性群体使用公共自然资源时，基于市场的管理工具在效率与公平之间的权衡，发现公平约束会降低配置效率，且收益或损失在群体中分布不均。
Abstract In this article, the authors show the trade‐offs between efficiency and equity that arise from the application of market‐based instruments to a heterogenous population of agents drawing from a natural resource pool. Using the example of groundwater, they find that there are overall losses in allocative efficiency when the centralized planner is constrained by equity considerations, and that the distribution of gains or losses to management becomes skewed asymmetrically across agents. These results demonstrate the importance of considering both efficiency gains and disparities in distributional inequity, when designing policy instruments that create winners and losers with potentially serious sociopolitical ramifications.