The Economics of Contingent Re-Auctions
研究了卖家对带使用限制的物品设定保留价、未达标则取消限制重拍的拍卖方式，发现这种方式既无效率也非卖家最优，并提出一种替代机制能实现有效结果。
We consider an auction environment where an object can be sold with usage restrictions that generate benefits to the seller but decrease buyers' valuations. In this environment, sellers such as the FCC have used “contingent re-auctions,” offering the restricted object with a reserve price, but re-auctioning it without restrictions if the reserve is not met. We show that contingent re-auctions are generally neither efficient nor optimal for the seller. We propose an alternative “exclusive-buyer mechanism” that can implement the efficient outcome in dominant strategies. In certain environments, parameters can be chosen so the seller's surplus is maximized across all selling procedures.