司法制衡

Judicial Checks and Balances

Journal of Political Economy · 2004
被引 671
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

基于71国宪法规则数据库,发现司法独立和宪法审查都与更高自由相关,且司法独立部分解释了普通法系对经济自由的正面影响。

Abstract

In the Anglo-American constitutional tradition, judicial checks and balances are often seen as crucial guarantees of freedom. Hayek distinguishes two ways in which the judiciary provides such checks and balances: judicial independence and constitutional review. We create a new database of constitutional rules in 71 countries that reflect these provisions. We find strong support for the proposition that both judicial independence and constitutional review are associated with greater freedom. Consistent with theory, judicial independence accounts for some of the positive effect of common-law legal origin on measures of economic freedom. The results point to significant benefits of the Anglo-American system of government for freedom.

司法独立违宪审查司法制衡经济自由