Sales Talk, Cancellation Terms and the Role of Consumer Protection
分析了卖家提供购买建议时，合同取消和退货政策如何影响市场效率。对理性消费者，宽松政策增强销售建议可信度；对轻信消费者，卖家会设置不利条款，此时最低法定标准能改善福利。
This article analyses contract cancellation and product return policies in markets in which sellers advise customers about the suitability of their offering. When customers are fully rational, it is optimal for sellers to offer the right to cancel or return on favourable terms. A generous return policy makes the seller's "cheap talk" at the point of sale credible. This observation provides a possible explanation for the excess refund puzzle and also has implications for the management of customer reviews. When customers are credulous, instead, sellers have an incentive to set unfavourable terms to exploit the inflated beliefs they induce in their customers. The imposition of a minimum statutory standard improves welfare and consumer surplus when customers are credulous. In contrast, competition policy reduces contractual inefficiencies with rational customers, but it is not effective with credulous customers. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.