DYNAMIC TRADING IN A DURABLE GOOD MARKET WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION*
分析竞争性耐用品市场中动态版本的“柠檬市场”问题，卖家对商品质量有私人信息，价格机制随时间将不同质量的卖家分到不同时期，所有质量商品最终都会交易，但等待导致市场失灵，尤其对高质量卖家不利。
We analyze a dynamic version of the Akerlof–Wilson “lemons” market in a competitive durable good setting. There is a fixed set of sellers with private information about the quality of their wares. The price mechanism sorts sellers of different qualities into different time periods—prices and average quality of goods traded increase over time. Goods of all qualities are traded in finite time. Market failure arises because of the waiting involved—particularly for sellers of better quality. The equilibrium path may exhibit intermediate breaks in trading.