承诺、灵活性与雇佣合同的选择

Commitment, flexibility and the choice of employment contracts

HUMAN RELATIONS · 2005
被引 45
人大 AFT50ABS 4

中文导读

研究企业在不确定环境下如何平衡雇佣合同中的承诺与灵活性,通过区分两种人力资产专用性(企业专用性和使用专用性)以及行为不确定性与竞争不确定性,为雇佣合同选择提供新视角。

Abstract

The study of the factors influencing a firm’s choice of employment contract occupies a critical role in the strategic human resource management literature. However, existing research does not adequately address an important question in an uncertain environment: Can a firm balance the apparently conflicting considerations of ‘commitment’ and ‘flexibility’, underlying employment contracts? By integrating research on transaction cost economics and the resource-based view, we propose that a firm may avoid the tradeoff between commitment and flexibility by differentiating between two types of human asset specificity: ‘firm specificity’ and ‘usage specificity’. The interplay between the two types of human asset specificity and their value-creation potential has fundamentally different implications for a firm’s choice of employment contract. By distinguishing between behavioral and competitive uncertainties, we propose that different types of uncertainties may influence levels of commitment and flexibility, and ultimately the choice of employment contract. Implications for research and practice are discussed.

战略人力资源管理交易成本经济学资源基础观雇佣合同不确定性