Rational Ponzi Games
探讨政府何时能通过发行债务且永不偿还本息来运行理性庞氏游戏，指出这需要无限数量的贷款人，并比较了理性庞氏游戏与资产价格泡沫或法定货币的异同。
When can a government run a rational Ponzi game, i.e., issue debt and never pay back any interest or principal? The transversalit y condition of each individual implies that such schemes require an i nfinity of lenders. Given this, horizons are unimportant: Ponzi games cannot be ruled out by assuming that agents have infinite horizons. The authors point out both the basic similarity of, and some key diff erences between, rational Ponzi games and asset price bubbles or fiat money. Regarding international debt, the analysis implies that what matters for the feasibility of rational Ponzi games are conditions in the lenders', not the borrowers', economy. Copyright 1988 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.