Dynamic Compensation Contracts with Private Savings
研究风险规避的代理人可以私下储蓄时的动态代理问题，发现最优合同下现金薪酬对失败有向下刚性，历史表现足够好时永久加薪，因表现差被解雇时获得遣散费以维持消费水平。
This article studies a dynamic agency problem in which a risk-averse agent can save privately. In the optimal contract, (i) cash compensations exhibit downward rigidity to failures; (ii) permanent pay raises occur when the agent's historical performance is sufficiently good; (iii) and when the agent is dismissed due to poor performance, he walks away with severance pay to support his post-firing consumption at the current compensation level. Thus, the theory can simultaneously explain the popularity of options-like compensation contracts and the increasing incidence of forced turnovers with sizeable severance pay. The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.